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Breaking the silence: disability and sexuality in contemporary Bulgaria 
 
Teodor Mladenov, teomladenov@gmail.com 
 
This is the Accepted Manuscript of the article published in M. Rasell and E. Iarskaia-
Smirnova (eds) (2014) Disability in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: History, 
Policy and Everyday Life. London: Routledge, pp. 141-164. 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores the silence surrounding disabled people’s sexuality in contemporary, 
postsocialist Bulgaria. The related desexualisation of disabled people is regarded as an 
instance of disablism that is sustained through medicalisation, patriarchal stereotypes and 
negative understandings of the bodily difference of ‘impairment’. The analysis draws on 
disability studies and phenomenology in order to elicit the workings of these mechanisms 
in everyday discourse as represented by an autobiographical essay and an internet 
discussion. A number of strategies for challenging disablist desexualisation are also 
highlighted whose point of departure is breaking the silence on the topic of disabled 
people’s sexuality. 
  
 2 
Background 
 
Since the fall of the state socialist regime in 1989, Bulgaria has experienced a turbulent 
‘transition’ from centrally planned towards free market economy and from one-party rule 
towards parliamentary democracy. This transformation has been accompanied by a number 
of significant social and cultural changes, but also by a number of continuities. The new 
order ostensibly undermined all kinds of boundaries – national, ideological, cultural. 
Travelling abroad became easier and people gained unprecedented access to previously 
scarce or explicitly forbidden cultural resources, a process that has been greatly enhanced 
by the internet since the mid-1990s. Nevertheless – or probably precisely as a reaction to 
such disorienting openness – negative attitudes towards difference along major socio-
cultural axes like ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation and disability have remained 
relatively stable. Public discussion on such issues was largely silenced during the state 
socialist period, when the problems of difference were expected to automatically wither 
away with the abolition of class exploitation. They did not disappear,1 but neither did they 
dissolve with the development of the free market and parliamentary democracy after 1989. 
The results of recent sociological studies strongly suggest that ‘at the moment in Bulgaria 
(and to a different but approximating degree in all postsocialist countries) many real 
problems exist in relation to the perception and approach towards difference’ (Tomova, 
2009: 120). 
 
                                                 
1 This is testified by the persistence of gender inequalities during state socialism despite the high inclusion 
of women in non-domestic labour activities (Tomova, 2009). Also revealing in this respect are the attempts 
at solving the problems of difference through violence, as reflected in the forceful assimilation of Bulgarian 
Turks at the end of the Todor Zhivkov’s rule (Curtis, 1992). 
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The interplay between change and continuity over the last two decades of transition is 
especially pronounced with regard to issues of disability, although Bulgarian sociologists 
rarely consider this form of difference in their analyses. Two examples will clarify the 
point. As might be expected, individualism has quickly become the dominant way of 
structuring relationships with others and the self in the new, aspiringly neoliberal order (cf. 
Outhwaite, 2011). Nevertheless, disabled people continue to be denied individual agency. 
This is particularly evident when one considers the ongoing hegemony of paternalistic 
personal assistance schemes (CIL, 2009). They were first introduced by the government in 
2002 and since then have proved time and again incredibly resistant to reforms along the 
lines of the Independent Living philosophy and practice (CIL, 2009; Mladenov, 2004). The 
other example is related to lexicon. In 2005, a major legislative change finally substituted 
the problematic label ‘invalid’ (invalid) with the more appealing ‘person with disability’ 
(chovek s uvrezhdane).2 The substitution was promoted by progressive disabled people’s 
organisations, reflecting the self-perception of the majority of disabled people in Bulgaria, 
particularly those of working age, as suggested by a nationally representative survey 
conducted in 2001 (CIL, 2002: 15). Yet everyday use, supported by the media, continues 
to obstinately resist this linguistic transformation – for a great number of Bulgarians, as for 
most of Bulgarian journalists, disabled people are still ‘invalids’.  
 
                                                 
2 Applied to a person, the word invalid has the same negative connotations in Bulgarian as in English. 
Bulgarians usually use the word uvrezhdane to refer to the bodily difference denoted by British social model 
theorists as ‘impairment’ (Oliver, 1996). In this sense, uvrezhdane is also used interchangeably with the word 
nedag. Following the social model of disability (ibid.), I translate uvrezhdane, as well as nedag, as 
‘impairment’. Yet in the instances of more ambiguous usage I translate uvrezhdane as ‘disability’ in order to 
preserve the allusion to the social aspects of the phenomenon implied in the original utterance. My translation 
is then simultaneously an interpretation informed by the social model of disability.  
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Illuminating such historical patterns makes it easier to trace the dynamics of disablism in 
Bulgaria. The term is introduced and widely used by British disability scholars as 
analogous to concepts like sexism, racism and homophobia (Thomas, 2004: 578-579).  
Accordingly, disablism can be defined as ‘a form of social oppression involving the social 
imposition of restrictions of activity on people with impairments and the socially 
engendered undermining of their psycho-emotional well-being’ (Goodley and Runswick-
Cole, 2011: 604, drawing on Thomas, 2007: 73). This definition follows the insights of the 
social model of disability (Oliver, 1996) which makes a sharp distinction between the 
social phenomenon of ‘disability’ and the bodily phenomenon of ‘impairment’. From this 
perspective, people with physical, sensory and/or mental impairments are disabled by 
society and it is this particular kind of oppression that is identified as ‘disablism’. Since the 
1980s, the social model has been very influential politically and conceptually, not only in 
Britain, but all over the world, including Bulgaria. Nevertheless, it has been criticised by 
disability scholars for taking the naturalness and negativity of impairment for granted (e.g., 
Michalko, 2002; Schillmeier, 2010). Such critiques suggest that it is imperative to consider 
as an essential aspect of disablism the belief that impairment ‘is inherently negative and 
should the opportunity present itself, be ameliorated, cured or indeed eliminated’ 
(Campbell, 2009: 5). 
 
Reports highlighting the inequality, segregation and oppression experienced by disabled 
Bulgarians have been mounting over the last decade, mainly due to the efforts of grassroots 
organisations of disabled people. These have included: nationwide studies criticising 
Bulgarian disability policy as a whole (CIL, 2002; 2003; 2004); critical analyses of 
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disability legislation (Panayotova and Todorov, 2007); accounts of the inaccessible built 
environment, of which many recent examples can be found in the media; cases of 
discrimination adjudicated by the Bulgarian Commission for Protection against 
Discrimination (www.kzd-nondiscrimination.com); and, reports on the degrading and 
inhuman conditions within residential institutions (Angelova, 2008; CIL, 2004; BHC, 
2011). In sum, the restrictions of activity and the undermining of the psycho-emotional 
well-being of disabled Bulgarians have been well documented by Bulgarian human rights 
advocates, with occasional support from the media. The genealogy of this pervasive 
disablism refers back to state socialist responses to disability (Mladenov, 2011: 479) but, 
more importantly, it has survived the demise of the regime. In 2007, an international 
comparative study covering fourteen European countries put Bulgaria on one of the last 
places (twelfth) in terms of the overall inclusion of disabled people in the country 
(International Disability Network, 2007). All this raises questions about the underlying 
features of the present Bulgarian context that sustain and/or facilitate disablism. Several 
such features can be outlined that might not be specifically Bulgarian when considered 
individually, but constitute a more or less distinctive physiognomy of the structure 
underlying disablism when taken together. 
 
Firstly, disability-related regulations, concepts and practices in Bulgaria have been heavily 
medicalised (International Disability Network, 2007: 64-66; Mladenov, 2004). Historically 
speaking, such medicalisation3 can be traced back to the influence of the Soviet approach 
                                                 
3 My understanding of the term is very similar to the one outlined by Holm (2009). Drawing on Peter Conrad, 
Holm (2009: 33) defines medicalisation as ‘the process that occurs when a given area of human activity is 
defined socially as falling under the proper purview of medicine’, including ‘any state that such a process 
might lead to’. Thus medicalisation ‘involves allowing the medical profession sole or pre-eminent power to 
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of defectology (Grigorenko, 1998) during state socialist times (on the Soviet medicalisation 
of disability see Iarskaia-Smirnova, 2011: 120). At present, it is most conspicuous in the 
standard method for certifying disability status – the ‘Medical expert assessment of the 
ability to work’ that exerts significant material and symbolic power over all structures and 
processes concerning disability (Panayotova and Todorov, 2007; Mladenov, 2011). And, 
as will be argued in the second part of this study, the medicalisation of disability permeates 
everyday discourse too. Secondly, Bulgarian disability policy-making is dominated by the 
so-called ‘nationally representative organisations of and for disabled people’ as defined in 
the Bulgarian Law for the Integration of People with Disabilities of 2005. These large 
membership-based umbrella structures have been criticised for reproducing and sustaining 
paternalistic and charity-focused approaches to disability (CIL, 2002; 2003; 2004; 
Mladenov, 2009).4 Yet they have retained their exclusive position as the government’s 
‘legitimate partner’ when disability policy is concerned, enjoying annual government 
subsidies (Panov and Genchev, 2011). Thirdly, disability-related thought and action in 
accord with the social model of disability and the Independent Living philosophy is 
confined to a few grassroots civil society entities. At present, these groups are small in size, 
financially fragile and often excluded from local and/or national policy-making.5 So far, 
                                                 
define a given issue, decide whether or not it is a problem, and define the appropriate (therapeutic) solution 
to the problem’ (ibid.). Holm also highlights the intrinsic relationship between medicalisation and social 
control: ‘the process of medicalization allows the medical profession to take control of an area of life that 
other parties, often ordinary people previously controlled’ (ibid.). 
4 The genealogy of these organisations is far from straightforward. Some, like the Union of the Deaf 
(www.sgbbg.com) or the Union of the Blind (ssb-bg.net), came into existence well before 1944, albeit under 
different names. Others, like the National Consumer Cooperative of the Blind (www.npksb.com), emerged 
during state socialist times. Yet others, like the Union of the Invalids (www.disability-bg.org) or the 
Bulgarian Association for Persons with Intellectual Disabilities (bapid.com), were founded after the fall of 
the regime in 1989. The extent to which the state socialist ideology and practice influenced the values, ideas 
and activities of these organisations is not immediately obvious and requires a separate analysis. 
5 This frailty of grassroots organisations is an aspect of a more general phenomenon: ‘The weakness of civil 
society, in the sense of associational life, remains a striking feature of the postcommunist world.’ (Outhwaite, 
2011: 8) Outhwaite cites Howard (2003: 13-14), who has pointed out that ‘[a]lthough the breakdown or 
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disability has not been pursued as a legitimate and valuable field of study by Bulgarian 
social and political scientists, nor by those working in the field of humanities. 
 
This list of features is far from exhaustive but it nevertheless provides some clues for 
imagining the present physiognomy of what underlies disablism in Bulgaria. In addition to 
these ‘macro-level’ features though, disablism is also deployed – and challenged – on the 
plane of the everyday. One needs to look at this micro-level in order to understand the 
constitution and reproduction of social order and meaning. Common, everyday 
understandings of disability revolve around people’s views about their own and others’ 
bodies, and particularly around bodily differences identified as ‘impairments’. There is 
much to learn from this ‘carnal politics of everyday life’, as Paterson and Hughes (1999) 
have put it. Proceeding from this presumption, in what follows I will explore how 
Bulgarians discuss disability in non-expert, public contexts. The conjunction of the topics 
of sexuality and disability in an autobiographical essay and an internet discussion will serve 
as a ‘magnifying glass’ that exposes the ways in which disablism is sustained and/or 
challenged in everyday discourse. 
 
As far as my own conception of the body is concerned, it is informed by phenomenology, 
where human body is seen as (i) a vehicle of meaning that is (ii) itself always already 
invested with meaning. This understanding of the body is captured by the 
phenomenological notion of living or lived body, in German – Leib (Heidegger, 2001; 
                                                 
survival of democracy may not be at stake, the quality of post-communist democracy suffers as a result of 
the weakness of civil society, as post-communist citizens become increasingly alienated from the political 
process, while simultaneously lacking the institutional leverage that organizations might provide’. 
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Merleau-Ponty, 2002). From such a perspective, pure physicality is an abstraction – an 
objectifying detachment from the meaning-engendering context or what phenomenologists 
call ‘world’ (Heidegger, 1962: 91-94). As Merleau-Ponty (2002: 131) puts it, ‘[t]o be a 
body, is to be tied to a certain world’. This phenomenological understanding of human 
corporeality is implicit in most of what follows. It allows me to suspend or ‘bracket’ the 
taken-for-granted negativity of impairment without disembodying the human being – an 
approach that has also been promoted by Paterson and Hughes (1999; for a more recent 
discussion see Scully, 2009). I will explicitly revisit these points in the conclusion. Now, I 
will return to the ‘macro level’ once more in order to introduce the specific topic of 
discourses on disability and sexuality that will be analysed in the second part of the paper. 
 
Disability and sexuality 
 
State socialism was reluctant to talk about sex. As Phillips (2010: 176) points out in relation 
to the former Soviet Union, ‘questions of gender and especially sex were a closed book 
throughout much of Soviet history’. This reluctance characterised the Soviet Bloc as a 
whole, where silence was imposed on public discussion of these issues and even on the 
open admission of sexuality (Tomova, 2009: 146). Such silencing was even more 
pronounced in Bulgaria than in East Germany or Hungary, for example, because of the 
relatively greater degree to which the country was closed off from western cultural 
influences. After 1989, discourses on sex and sexuality were quickly and effectively 
normalised and liberalised. Nevertheless, disabled people have remained excluded from 
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such liberalisation, as if continuing to live under the state socialist taboo.6 Of course, the 
cultural desexualisation of disabled people is by no means a specifically state-socialist or 
specifically Bulgarian phenomenon. It is characteristic of western modernity in general, 
where disabled people have consistently been regarded as ‘sexless beings’ – ‘aesthetically 
neutered objects of benevolence and assistance’ (Hahn, 1990: 314). Yet the Bulgarian case 
can furnish important insights into the mechanisms of rendering disabled people ‘sexless’, 
especially given the physiognomy underlying Bulgarian disablism outlined in the previous 
section. In such an analysis, differences from western countries may be easier to spot (cf. 
Shakespeare et al., 1996) than those from the countries of the former Soviet Bloc, where 
similarities seem to prevail, although the available information is scarce (Phillips, 2010: 
182-183; see also Iarskaia-Smirnova, 2002). 
 
By speaking publicly about disabled people’s sexuality, Bulgarians break an important 
cultural taboo that, although genealogically traceable to state socialist ‘puritanism’, 
transcends its boundaries. This is the tacit prohibition on associating issues related to sex 
with issues related to disability. Western modernity has exempted certain groups from this 
interdiction, but their membership has almost exclusively been confined to experts in the 
‘helping’ domain: ‘There is quite an industry producing work around the issue of sexuality 
and disability, but it is an industry controlled by professionals from medical and 
psychological and sexological backgrounds’ (Shakespeare et al., 1996: 3). Hughes (2000: 
                                                 
6 This situation suggestively parallels the one concerning homosexuality: ‘The prohibition of discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation is incorporated in a numbed of normative acts, and particularly in the Law 
for Protection against Discrimination. At the same time, in the country there is actually no public debate on 
the problems of homosexuals as problems of power relations in a society that is dominated by hierarchical 
sexist attitudes’ (Tomova, 2009: 147). 
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564) also points out that, apart from popular prejudice, the ‘sexual invalidation of disabled 
people is mediated by medical knowledge’. The corollary is that discourses related to 
disabled people’s sexuality have been heavily individualised, professionalised and/or 
pathologised. A ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault, 1980: 131) has been constituted, regulating 
what can legitimately be said and who can legitimately say it. This regime regulates 
Bulgarian public discourse too, perhaps to a greater extent than in most other European 
countries, including some of the Eastern European ones.7 Consequently, the mere bringing 
of the topic of disability and sexuality in a non-expert public context is already a subversive 
act, a challenge of dominant mechanisms of truth production (cf. Hahn, 1990: 312-313). 
Such an act becomes even more subversive when the person speaking is himself or herself 
(self-identified as) disabled, for it then becomes an instance of reclaiming the voice 
(Milner, 2011) – a cornerstone of individual and collective empowerment and 
emancipation. 
 
What is needed to make such subversive and empowering acts possible? Spaces for 
alternative public deliberation are an important foundation because they provide discursive 
‘clearings’ (I am borrowing the term from Heidegger, 1962: 171 and 401-402) where 
disability issues can be addressed in non-expert – and, accordingly, non-pathologised 
and/or non-paternalistic – ways. Few such ‘clearings’ have existed in the twenty odd years 
of the Bulgarian transition. Among them were the periodicals edited and published by the 
Center for Independent Living – Sofia, a Bulgarian non-profit, non-governmental 
organisation of disabled people founded in the mid-1990s with the mission ‘to provide 
                                                 
7 For a comparative analysis of disability-related policies and practices in fourteen European countries see 
International Disability Network (2007). 
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disabled people with the support they need to achieve independent and complete human 
living’ (cil.bg/en). The Center’s periodicals included the monthly newsletter Independent 
Living, of which 52 issues were published in 1999-2004; the magazine Integral, of which 
nine issues were published in 2001-2004; and the monthly magazine Independent Living, 
intended to succeed the previous two, of which six issues were published in the second half 
of 2004. This prolific publishing endeavour came to a halt in December 2004.8 
 
All of the Center’s periodicals contained a special section entitled ‘Taboo’. It was explicitly 
designated for discussing openly and publicly disability-related issues that usually 
remained silenced, including issues related to disabled people’s sexuality. I will take as my 
example an autobiographical essay that first appeared in the Integral magazine in 2002 and 
was subsequently reprinted in the Independent Living newsletter in 2003. The four-page 
essay, entitled ‘I, my impairment and sex’ (Az, moeto uvrezhdane i seksat), was written by 
Nina Zhisheva and appeared in the ‘Taboo’ section of both periodicals. This piece deserves 
to be read not only as a text, but also as an event. It was a venture not simply into uncharted 
territory, but also into one which has for a long time been dominated by expert knowledge 
and power. The rich and multi-layered essay is thus an instance of the aforementioned 
                                                 
8 I have collaborated with the organisation throughout the first decade of the new millennium, although I 
have not been directly involved in its publishing programme. All the periodicals of the Center were supported 
by foreign donors through programmes for civil society development in Bulgaria – none enjoyed any 
financial support from the Bulgarian state. Consequently, when the foreign programmes ended, the Center’s 
periodicals disappeared, for they could not sustain themselves through free market mechanisms. As in other 
cases related to cultural and social policy issues, the market proved to be a problematic regulator. For as far 
as the ‘public good’ was concerned, the Center’s publications had an important and pioneering function – to 
open up a public space for the articulation of subjugated knowledges. In a similar fashion to state socialist 
taboos or outright repressions – and similarly to the ‘regime of truth’ of medicalisation – the market can also 
silence voices. 
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‘reclaiming the voice’. Below, I reference the text with page numbers only; the translation 
from Bulgarian is mine. 
 
‘I, my impairment and sex’ 
 
Zhisheva (2002) identifies from the outset the two interrelated issues that I have already 
singled out – the desexualisation of disabled people and silence on the topic of disabled 
people’s sexuality: 
Interestingly, has it ever occurred to you that disabled people need sex too? No? 
According to many they are so ‘impaired’ and the sex is so ‘normal’ and natural 
that it is as if they are mutually exclusive. What is more, for disabled people 
themselves sex is almost always Taboo Number One. I have a severe physical 
impairment myself and I know it, alas, from my own experience. I know many 
people like myself and I admit in anguish that I have rarely heard these people speak 
frankly among themselves on the topic of sex. (p. 6) 
 
These two issues of desexualisation and silencing are aspects of the same existential-
ontological problem. Zhisheva regards sexuality as an essential dimension of full human 
being – ‘sex really incorporates the beauty of everything human’ (p. 6). She thus hints at 
the mechanism for denying the status of subjects (Shakespeare et al., 1996: 3), or, more 
generally, the ‘ontological invalidation’ (Goodley and Runswick-Cole, 2011: 608) of 
disabled people that is put in operation by the denial of sexuality. The violence of disablism 
(ibid.) which is related to this ontological invalidation is not targeted at a specific feature 
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of the individual, but at his/her very being. Such violence is experienced by the person who 
comes to inhabit a world where there is ‘no place’ for her/him – an uncanny or unhomely 
dwelling. ‘Exclusion, even oppression is a kind of homelessness. It implies a world of 
bodily discomfort, of being left out in the cold’, write Paterson and Hughes (1999: 604). 
Zhisheva’s point is that a profound existential-ontological crisis develops when an essential 
aspect of one’s being is denied a place through desexualisation: ‘The woman in me had to 
fall asleep in order for me to live. (…) Do you understand what I was doing? Allegedly in 
order to live, I was slowly killing myself’ (p. 8). 
 
Where does this desexualisation of disabled people come from? What causes it? Zhisheva 
suggests that it comes from culture and not from nature – disabled people are not naturally 
a-sexual. This is the main thrust of her argument and it is rearticulated at several points 
throughout the essay: 
…with time I also found out something that perhaps will seem preposterous or 
intolerable [nelepo i nedopustimo]… or grotesque. I found out that I, a woman with 
impairment, think, desire, seek and have a need – a real and completely normal 
need – for sex. (p. 7) …I was a normal person and needed sex just as much as I 
needed food when I was hungry or medical assistance when in pain. I needed sex 
just as much as everyone else (p. 8). 
 
The desexualisation of disabled people is a question of ‘upbringing’, ‘attitudes’, ‘societal 
perception’ (p. 6). It is made, not given. Zhisheva also identifies the particular cultural 
construct that is responsible for desexualisation – the perception of impairment as 
inherently negative, as ‘something ugly that, with its very essence [sas samata si 
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sashtnost], kills the desire for beauty’ (p. 6). ‘I was ugly. I was crippled. I was prejudged 
as being no good. I was not entitled to sex.’ (p. 8) This negative understanding is tied to a 
stifling charity attitude: ‘Just about that time – as if from the Salvation Army… – good 
relatives and friends visited and laboured to convince me that one can live without sex’ (p. 
8). But most importantly, this negative understanding is solidified through internalisation: 
‘I was slowly killing myself, day after day going down, deeper and deeper into the sticky 
swamp of self-pity’ (p. 8). If one is not able to disregard the part of one’s self that is invested 
with negativity, this negativity tends to take over one’s whole being. Silence becomes self-
imposed, negativity transforms into self-hatred and oppression is internalised: 
I resented life, fate, God, the physicians who injected me with the live vaccine 
against polio. I resented my doom, my ugliness, myself, nature for creating male 
and female persons, my natural desires. (…) I came to hate my breasts that 
disobediently continued to react as an erogenous zone whenever unwittingly 
touched. I wanted to vanish from this world, not to be there, to have never existed. 
(…) My God, I came to be ashamed of myself – I was deformed, incomplete, 
useless! I was so convinced of this ugliness and uselessness of mine that even if 
someone told me he had feelings about me, I just did not believe him – I thought 
that he did it solely out of courtesy, because he realized how much it would hurt 
me if he disregarded me too. (pp. 7-8) 
 
The self-hatred related to ‘internalised oppression’ (Mason, 1990) comes with cynicism 
and is self-perpetuating – one tends to unwittingly treat others in such a way that they will 
react negatively: ‘I became evil and cruel and people did not like me’ (p. 8; see also p. 9). 
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What is the way out of this vicious self-negating trap? Zhisheva’s text suggests that the 
solution is to recognize its imposed or constructed character and thus to restore the 
externality of this negativity – in other words, to denaturalise the existential-ontological 
negation. In disability studies, this has been aided by pointing out the disabling features of 
the built environment that people with impairments inhabit (e.g., Finkelstein, 1980: 25-26). 
Some poststructuralist disability scholars have also highlighted the disabling features of 
knowledge/power constructs, including those concerning ‘impairment’ (Tremain, 2002). 
Another option, suggested by the feminist strand of disability studies, has been to locate 
negativity in the objectifying ‘male gaze’ (Thomson, 1997: 26). This last possibility is 
actually hinted at by Zhisheva when she refers bitterly to ‘those who did not see the woman 
in me but noticed only my deformed bottom and the apparatuses’ (p. 8) – ‘[b]ecause men 
judge whether a woman is “good” by the size of her breasts, the length of the legs and the 
behind’ (p. 7). But Zhisheva does not elaborate this critique of sexual objectification and 
its relation to disability. Instead, she chooses to focus on the technical aids – the 
orthopaedic leg braces – she utilises in order to get about: 
I found out that in order to have sex, I have to take off my iron apparatuses… and 
they are ugly. They have never been part of me, yet they are my physical 
independence – I can move from here to there only with them. I came to hate them 
and I have hated them to date. (…) I hated these iron things, I regarded them as 
fetters, they enveloped [obvivaha] not only my body, but also my soul. Yes, I felt 
pain in my apparatuses [moite aparati me bolyaha]. (p. 7) 
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This attitude towards the leg braces is ambivalent. On the one hand, they provide 
independence, on the other hand, they are ‘fetters.’  Zhisheva asserts that they are not part 
of her, but they still ‘envelope’ her body and her soul to the point where she can feel pain 
in them. The reason for this ambivalence is that, while technical aids enable a person to 
exercise agency on one level, on another level they also ‘help to disable by working to 
reproduce the conditions for the making of difference and disability in the first instance’ 
(Moser, 2006: 388-389). Similarly to the everyday environment, assistive technology 
embodies a corporeal norm. Consequently, it can cause the bodily difference of 
‘impairment’ to seem problematic or, in other words, to dys-appear by appearing as dys-
functional (Paterson and Hughes, 1999: 602-604). Indeed, it is not simply that the ‘iron 
apparatuses’ are themselves ‘ugly’, the problem is that they make the person who uses 
them ‘ugly’: ‘In the beginning I tried to hide them by all means, but I was never successful 
– they always meanly exposed themselves and betrayed my incompleteness, my difference. 
They made me ugly.’ (p. 7) Yet, being detachable, in both material and cultural sense, 
mobility aids can also disburden the person and her body form self-hatred; they can 
translate self-directed hatred into object-directed discontent. More generally, as something 
made, as something constructed, technology testifies that the ‘ugliness’ of the impaired 
body is itself not given. 
 
The turning point comes with an encounter. A young man approaches Zhisheva in a disco 
club and asks her whether she dances. Still trapped in the self-perpetuating pattern of 
internalised oppression, she immediately assumes that he is mocking at her and retorts: ‘I 
do not dance. Don’t you see that I am an invalid’ (p. 9). Yet it turns out that he is not 
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interested in her body, but in her soul: ‘I did not ask about your body. I asked about your 
soul. I cannot dance either, and I am not an invalid. No, believe me, beautiful music can 
make my soul really dance.’ (p. 9) At that, the man looks at Zhisheva in a special way – 
his eyes are ‘childishly sincere’ and he does not detach them from her eyes while speaking 
to her (p. 9). It is this non-objectifying look, coupled with the unexpected reply that sets 
Zhisheva free from self-negation. She is able, for the first time, to detach her self from the 
negativity carried by her orthopaedic devices: ‘Then, in this infinitely short moment, I 
understood – I loved through my soul and not through my legs, ugly as they were in the 
iron apparatuses.’ (p. 9) 
 
Notwithstanding the personal transformation, it seems that this new, emancipated self is 
still radically disembodied. Furthermore, the detachment of the soul from the body seems 
to reproduce the very pattern of desexualisation that Zhisheva has criticised at the outset. 
Consequently, existential-ontological invalidation returns through the proverbial back door 
– the disablist negation of corporeal difference is reinscribed at the very moment of its 
alleged overcoming. This problem predates every attempt at disability emancipation 
through privileging personhood – or what has been criticised in the disability studies 
literature as the ‘“person first” ideology’. As Michalko (2002: 10-11) has argued, 
‘[c]hoosing personhood over disability emphasises both the strength of personhood and its 
separation from the body’. The corollary is that: 
Inclusion on the basis of privileging personhood over disability is thus never 
inclusionary. The difference-of-disability is always excluded in this version of 
inclusion. Social change is never part of such an inclusion. (ibid.: 155) 
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There are two considerations that at least complicate such a reading of Zhisheva’s text. The 
first is that Zhisheva does not actually distance herself from her body but rather from her 
technical aids: ‘there are no orthopaedic apparatuses for the soul. The free soul just does 
not need them’ (p. 9). The second consideration is related to Zhisheva’s understanding of 
‘soul’. It seems that her use of the notion mirrors the phenomenological concept of lived 
body because Zhisheva actually proposes an embodied understanding of the soul: ‘Yes, I 
had a soul – and she was able to dance! Yes, I had a soul and she was able to love, to make 
love – and to be made love to [Da, az imah dusha i tya umeeshe da obicha, da lyubi – i da 
bade lyubena].’ (p. 9, emphasis in the original) It is this insight that leads to the conclusive 
reclaiming of positive self-identity. Importantly, this newly found identity is a sexually 
integrated identity, one which does not deny one’s body and sexuality, but accepts and 
enacts them: 
Why did I allow myself to perceive myself as ugly, useless, deformed? This was 
absolutely not me! This was some other Nina, different from myself. I am Nina – 
with a fragrance of endless hot meadows, the ardent Nina, who also can burn hearts 
with her look, the exceptional Nina, the one and only, the unique. Nina, who can 
caress gently, who can whisper the sweetest words and make the loved one pulsate 
with happiness and desires. With the same happiness and desires that fill me. (p. 9) 
 
Zhisheva enhances this affirmative statement with the proud assertion of her motherhood: 
‘Both of my children were conceived as a result of hot sexual experiences.’ (p. 9) Thus she 
challenges another widespread stigma – that disabled persons, and particularly women, 
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cannot be (good) parents: ‘Whereas motherhood is often seen as compulsory for women, 
disabled women are often denied or discouraged from the reproductive role that some 
feminists find oppressive.’ (Thomson, 1997: 26) The relationship between disability, 
sexuality, femininity and motherhood will be explored in the next section. I will finish this 
one with Zhisheva’s last sentence that rearticulates the fundamental existential importance 
attributed to sexuality: ‘I don’t know whether this is sex or joy, or love… The only thing I 
know is that it is something wonderful, something that makes us human, us – women and 
men.’ (p. 9) 
 
‘We talk about sex’ 
 
Let me now turn towards a collective reflection on the topic of sexuality and disability. The 
discussion took place on an internet forum hosted by the Bulgarian web portal www.dir.bg. 
It was held under the rubric ‘We talk about sex’ (Govorim za seks). Neither the website, 
nor the forum, not even the rubric were specifically focused on disability-related issues – 
the setting was non-professional, non-specialised and as mainstream as one can get. The 
mere fact that disability was discussed in the context of sexuality, rather than sexuality in 
the context of disability, made a difference. The discussion happened in 2004 and was 
renewed for a short while in 2007 with some of the original participants taking part in the 
later exchange as well. All the discussants participated anonymously, using nicknames 
instead of their real names. The personal information disclosed occasionally suggests that 
many of them had only a marginal interest in the topic of disability while some were 
relatives or friends of disabled people and only few were disability professionals (service 
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providers). Most importantly, several participants identified themselves as disabled, thus 
enacting – like Zhisheva – the aforementioned ‘reclaiming the voice’. Both male and 
female participants took part and no gender seems to have dominated the discussion, 
although gender-specific understandings did (as will be explained below). The number of 
participants can be estimated at 35, providing that nobody used more than one nickname, 
which seems unlikely. The number of comments exchanged in 2004 was 71, with further 
25 added in 2007, or 96 in total. All this testifies that the topic attracted significant interest.9 
 
There are no indications that the discussion was triggered by a specific event. It was 
initiated by one of the participants who formulated its subject as ‘On bodily deficiencies’, 
and its guiding question as ‘How many of you would accept your partner having physical 
impairments without this embarrassing you?’ At some point during the discussion 
Zhisheva’s essay was posted in full by another participant (judging by the personal 
information shared by this participant, it seem unlikely that it was Zhisheva herself). This 
posting stimulated further debate and testifies that the Integral magazine reached the 
mainstream. The collective and open nature of the dir.bg forum, coupled with participants’ 
anonymity elicited tacit yet widespread understandings of disability and sexuality. Even 
statements that were deliberately provocative or purposefully exaggerated drew on 
culturally available knowledges. Whilst it is questionable that this open, collective and 
anonymous discussion produced more truth on the topic, it does seem that it did – and it 
still can – stimulate reflexive awareness of the mechanisms that produce and sustain such 
                                                 
9 The archive can be found online at  
http://clubs.dir.bg/showthreaded.php?Board=talkabout&Number=1942347955, last accessed 12 January 
2012. 
 21 
truths. As was the case with Zhisheva’s essay, the material is too rich to be 
comprehensively covered within the thematic and material confines of this study. 
Therefore, I will restrict myself to outlining several important themes that relate directly to 
the foregoing analysis – silencing and desexualisation, the meaning of impairment, 
medicalisation, and gender. The translation of all the comments from Bulgarian is mine; 
they are referenced with the latinised participants’ nicknames in brackets. 
 
Silencing and desexualisation 
 
The reflexivity hinted at in the preceding paragraph manifests itself at an early stage of the 
discussion. Echoing Zhisheva’s essay, the silencing of discourses that bring together 
disability and sexuality is explicitly recognized and thematised: ‘what you are talking about 
is one of the many taboos… And as a taboo it causes a spontaneous dread [uzhas] and/or 
denial [otrichane] in most people.’ (Lilit) The dread and/or denial brought about by the 
topic are seen as existentially motivated. Echoing Shakespeare’s (1994) reflections on 
disability and disavowal of frailty, it is pointed out that impairment produces uneasiness 
because it is a reminder of human finitude: ‘physical impairments confront us with our own 
vulnerability and fragility’ (Lilit). Reluctance to engage with the topic is openly expressed 
by another participant who regards the issue of disability as ‘too serious and important’, 
concluding: ‘I do not see it as appropriate for this club [that is, the online discussion club 
‘We talk about sex’]. People with impairments have too many problems for us to try to 
disentangle them here.’ (GROZNIK 1) This statement unwittingly reproduces the already 
highlighted ‘regime of truth’ that regulates discourses on disability. It implies that ‘serious 
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matters’ should be addressed by ‘serious people’ (read ‘experts’) in ‘serious settings’ (a 
number of such special places have existed in Bulgaria for a long time). As such, the 
statement is an instance of both desexualisation and silencing – in response, the initiator of 
the discussion retorts: ‘the unwillingness to discuss such a topic here is also a form of 
discrimination against people with physical problems. They too have a right to sex and they 
have a right to speak about it.’ (High Carbon Steel) Accordingly, breaking the silence 
surrounding disabled people’s sexuality is aptly regarded as a prerequisite for social 
change, where the very inclusion of disabled people in society is at stake: 
It is not enough to make the public transport and the public buildings accessible for 
them in order to integrate them [disabled people]. Social engagement is needed too. 
And a change of attitude, which has to do with the mind and begins with not 
disregarding the topic as a taboo. (Kotkata Marta) 
 
This briefly sketched exchange revolves around the two issues that also served as points of 
departure for Zhisheva’s essay: desexualisation and silencing. In addition, it hints at the 
ways in which these disablist patterns are reproduced on an everyday level. People 
maintain ‘regimes of truth’ by disciplining themselves and others with regard to what can 
be spoken, by whom and in what settings. The exchange also illuminates the possibility 
and importance of resistance to these everyday disciplinary pressures. Such resistance is 
important because it addresses existential and socio-political problems like discrimination, 
exclusion and the disavowal of human finitude. Last but not least, the exchange testifies to 
the high degree of reflexivity of the discussants, facilitated, no doubt, by the possibility of 
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publicly deliberating the issues of concern. Central among these issues is the meaning of 
impairment. 
 
The meaning of impairment 
 
From the outset of the discussion, impairment is regarded in negative terms, thus 
reproducing the hegemonic understanding of this type of bodily difference as a ‘limit 
without possibility’ (Titchkosky, 2005: 657). The subject ‘On bodily deficiencies’ (Za 
telesnite nedostatatsi) frames corporeal differences in terms of disadvantage or lack. The 
guiding question ‘How many of you would accept your partner having physical 
impairments without this embarrassing you [bez tova da vi smuti]?’ implies that 
impairments themselves cause distress. The negativity conveyed by such wording becomes 
conspicuous if one considers alternative ways of posing the question, for example: ‘What 
are the physical characteristics of your partner that do not comply with the norm and that 
attract you?’ One could also change the addressee of the utterance, again with significant 
consequences: ‘What are the physical oddities of yours that attract your partner?’ 
Questioning, in other words, has a twofold significance. On the one hand, it is 
indispensable for opening up discursive ‘clearings’ where phenomena can appear and 
become accessible. Yet, questioning also confines the discoursing parties to the local 
worlds thus disclosed. A symptom of such confinement is the production of tautologies 
like this one: ‘Bodily deficiencies are misfortune for the people who have them.’ 
(GROZNIK 1) Even those discussants who attempt to challenge the pre-supposed 
negativity of impairment tend to fall back upon it. The reason is that this negativity is 
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implied in the very terms that allow them to take part in the discussion in the first place: ‘It 
is not so much that the people themselves are those who do not accept the bodily 
deficiencies of their partner, but the surrounding ones, the others’ (razbiram). Note that it 
would be very difficult for me to ‘accept’ my bodily difference if it is regarded as deficiency 
in the first place. 
 
On the other hand, the negative understanding of impairment does not – and cannot – hold 
absolute sway over participants. Even within the naturalised negativity of impairment a 
degree of uncertainty is present. For example, impairment is regarded as self-evidently 
problematic; it is given (not made) as problematic; it is conceived as problematic outside 
any interpretive economy, outside culture, language, understanding, meaning: ‘It is as 
though we are something disgusting that does not deserve to exist. It [what we are] does 
not deserve [to exist], but nevertheless it is a fact.’ (High Carbon Steel) And yet, High 
Carbon Steel also points out that ‘to have a physical problem practically means to be 
marked for life’. Now, to denote impairment as a ‘mark’ suggests that impairment is 
actually implicated in a particular interpretive economy. From such a perspective, 
impairment is a sign. Yet again, it is a special kind of a sign – one that cannot be effaced 
and has a fixed meaning. Nevertheless, such rendering suggests that the problem of 
impairment is an interpretive problem, a problem of an interpretation that has gone rigid, 
an interpretation lacking plasticity or flexibility: ‘my experience shows that they [disabled 
people] remain to a great extent confined in their own environment… mostly because other 
people avoid them, even if they do not want it – these are instincts’ (hose). 
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Is then impairment something naturally negative or something culturally negative? Can it 
be one without being the other? Can it be both, without undermining the very distinction 
between ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’? Such questions implicitly challenge the negativity of 
impairment within the very terms that take it for granted. In addition, there are discussants 
who challenge this negativity explicitly: ‘what I cannot understand is why you decided that 
impairment is a misfortune’ (she the wolf). Some come even closer to the ‘affirmative 
model’ of disability (Swain and French, 2000) by finding beauty in impairment: ‘One of 
the men who has impressed me most is blind – the curious thing is that his eyes are 
incredibly beautiful, beautiful blind eyes’ (SilentEnigma). 
 
The negativity of impairment is also at stake in distinguishing between ‘minor’ and ‘major’ 
impairments, or between ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ impairments, where the former are 
regarded as acceptable or even as ‘charming extra[s]’ (alexbg67), while the latter – as 
unacceptable, particularly in the context of intimate and/or sexual relations. A number of 
participants make such claims, for example: ‘Blindness and limping – OK. But imagine 
that you are in bed with a person who has chunks instead of arms; or with a woman who, 
instead of a breast, has a hole’ (seriozna 36); ‘The only and most dangerous [impairments] 
are mental and emotional deficiency; everything else makes the loved one even more 
unique.’ (Sex Maniac) While as a rule such statements reproduce and reinforce disablism, 
they nevertheless highlight another internal instability of meaning – the scope of the 
concept of ‘impairment’ cannot be fixed and its boundary is subject to constant negotiations 
(cf. Thomson, 1997: 12-15). This is also reflected in the frequent uncertainties and disputes 
about what counts as ‘acceptable’ or ‘unacceptable’ impairments: ‘But otherwise I also 
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know a family where the man has had both legs amputated at the knee. He was like that 
when they met. And they have lived harmoniously for many years’ (seriozna 36); ‘My 
mother has a serious physical impairment of the right half of her body but I am always 
pleased to see how my father watches her with that carried-away look.’ (SilentEnigma) 
 
To summarise, the online discussion incorporated numerous implicit and explicit 
challenges to the negative understanding of impairment – an understanding that 
nevertheless marks the discussion’s point of departure. Implicit challenges betray the 
inherent instability of attempts to fix the meaning of physical difference. Explicit 
challenges testify to the subversive potential of collective reflection on disability and 
sexuality. In both cases, the mechanisms of subversion are similar to the ones mobilised by 
Zhisheva in her essay – they make corporeal negativity appear less private, less natural, 
and/or less fixed. Nevertheless, the negative understanding of impairment retains its 
hegemony throughout the discussion. One of the main reasons for this is the pervasive 
medicalisation of impairment-related discourses and practices. 
 
Medicalisation 
 
Drawing on their research with disabled people in the United Kingdom, Shakespeare et al. 
(1996: 10) point out that ‘[i]n the realm of sex and love, the generalised assumption that 
disability is a medical tragedy becomes dominant and inescapable’. The medicalisation of 
disability is also hegemonic in Bulgaria and is among the most consistent features of the 
discussions on disabled people’s sexuality, even when they explicitly endeavour to 
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challenge disablism. Disabled people, their outlook, lifestyles, life chances and life choices 
are consistently counterposed to those of healthy people. Below are some examples of how 
medicalisation manifests itself in everyday discourse, taken from the dir.bg discussion: 
A healthy woman, who nevertheless is marked with huge purple spots on her skin, 
would agree much more readily to have a relation with a blind person than someone 
who is impeccably beautiful (otherwise who is going to admire her beauty). 
(Kurator) 
 
…it is not possible for a healthy person to fall in love with an impaired [nedagav] 
one, this only happens in the movies… (GROZNIK 1) 
 
…the truth is that even if someone has been born completely healthy, nobody, 
absolutely no person is insured that she or he won’t be injured some day and go 
over to the category ‘invalid’. (Lilit) 
 
…people with disabilities do not have problems… the healthy have problems with 
them… (she the wolf) 
 
Every time [I visit the pool] I see how she swims more than all the healthy women 
in the pool. She has a great body, despite her problem. I admire her because of her 
incredible will… (Idiotche) 
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In these examples the distinction between those who are ‘healthy’ and those who are not is 
used to organise different and even mutually challenging arguments about disability and 
intimacy. The first comment underlines the importance of appearance, engaging in what 
has been identified by Hughes (2000) as the ‘aesthetic invalidation’ of disabled people. 
The argument is furthermore gendered – it is a woman who is expected to be worried about 
appearance, an issue that I will elaborate on below. Most importantly, the possibility for 
intimacy is grounded in deficiency. Thus not only individuals, but also their intimate 
relations, are seen as governed by privation. It is not that Mariyka is attracted to Ivancho, 
it is that a lack of beauty is attracted to a lack of sight. The second comment rearticulates 
this conviction in negativity-driven intimacy. Disabled people are lumped together on the 
basis of pure and simple privation – they are alike because they all lack something. The 
third comment is of a different sort – it highlights the universal precariousness of human 
condition, articulating a reminder of finitude that is supposed to enhance acceptance and 
understanding of difference. Similarly intended, the forth comment points towards the 
attitudinal barriers that create problems for disabled people. Finally, the fifth comment 
attempts to challenge negative perceptions of disability by rendering it in heroic terms, in 
terms of ‘overcoming’ – a strategy that nevertheless takes the negativity of impairment for 
granted. Notwithstanding their differences, all these statements about disabled people’s 
bodies, identities, relationships and lives invoke the notion of ‘health’. Crawford (2006: 
403) has pointed out that ‘[i]n modern societies, the meaningful practice of health is 
inextricably linked to the science, practice and layered meanings of biomedicine’. The 
persistent recourse to ‘health’ is then both a manifestation and an effect of medicalisation, 
especially when disability-related issues are concerned. 
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This becomes clear in cases when medicalisation is bound up with the belief in 
reproduction as the ultimate purpose of life. Although pro-natalism has been in decline 
since the beginning of the Bulgarian transition, 74.2% of female and 67.9% of male 
Bulgarians, responding to the European Values Study of 2008 
(www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu), still maintained that a woman needs to have children in 
order to fulfil herself as a person (Pamporov, 2009: 162). Some of the participants in the 
dir.bg discussion reproduce these values in uncompromising terms: ‘the main aim of men 
and women getting together is to have children’ (Kradets na sartsa). Accordingly, it is 
suggested that disabled people are excluded from sexual discourses and practices due to: 
our instinctive striving to ‘pair’ with healthy partners – in order to secure healthy 
genes, guaranteeing healthy offspring. True, not every physical impairment is 
genetic – and even if it is, it does not necessarily preclude the person from creating 
completely healthy children. But here we are speaking about instincts and primary 
reactions which for most of the people are not conscious and thought through [a]nd 
which serve the purpose of our survival as a biological species over the course of 
evolution. (Lilit) 
 
In this vision, ‘offspring’ provides a fixed teleological point of reference for human 
existence. The meaning of human life is to reproduce itself on the biological level – i.e., 
‘to secure healthy genes, guaranteeing healthy offspring’ or, more generally, to survive as 
a species. Notably, such an understanding wholeheartedly espouses the norm of health and 
it is indeed hard to imagine modern reproduction outside the purview of medical 
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professionals, institutions and technologies (cf. Holm, 2009). Against this background, the 
differences associated with impairment seem problematic. The reason is that, according to 
Lilit, impairment is instinctively equated with lack of health – a lack that is seen as 
transferable to offspring. Consequently, suggests Lilit, people with impairments tend to be 
automatically excluded from the reproductive equation, and with it – from discourses and 
practices of sexuality. In sum, the medicalised notion of health imposes a hierarchical 
classificatory order on human diversity through reference to a norm – ‘healthy partners’, 
‘healthy genes’, ‘healthy offspring’ or ‘healthy children’. It thereby impairs the ability to 
imagine intimate and/or sexual relations without constantly referring to the ‘naturally 
given’ ideal of able-bodiedness. Besides being medicalised, this ideal is also gendered, 
which significantly adds to its rigidity and power. 
 
Gender 
 
Despite inclusion of women in non-domestic labour, the state-socialist regime remained 
patriarchal in many important respects (Tomova, 2009: 134-136). Postsocialist societies 
have reasserted these patriarchal values in a process of ‘re-traditionalization…, where 
women have been ushered back into hearth and home, while men play the dominant roles 
in the new market economies and new political structures’ (Phillips, 2010: 178). In her 
analysis of disability in present-day Ukraine Phillips (2010) has convincingly shown how 
disabled Ukrainians negotiate their identities within this male-centred regime of 
knowledge/power, especially when sexuality is concerned. Similar considerations have 
been put forward by Iarskaia-Smirnova (2002) with regard to disability and sexuality in 
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contemporary Russia. It is therefore unsurprising that many of the participants in the dir.bg 
discussion reproduced patriarchal understandings about the roles of men and women in 
society. 
 
In a world dominated by masculinist visions and values, framing impairment in terms of 
‘lack’ parallels how the feminine is also understood in terms of ‘lack’. Thus ‘[b]oth the 
female and the disabled body are cast as deviant and inferior; both are excluded from full 
participation in public as well as economic life; both are defined in opposition to a norm 
that is assumed to possess natural physical superiority’ (Thomson, 1997: 19). Indeed, the 
perception of disabled people, male and female alike, as weak, incapable or lacking is often 
enhanced by feminising the bodily difference of impairment: ‘What better way to exclude 
a legally blind boy than to feminize the biology of his eyes? What better way to exclude 
me from the “guys” than to castrate me – “cunt eyes”.’ (Michalko, 2002: 20-21) On the 
other hand, the lack associated with being a woman in a man’s world is often perceived as 
the ultimate impairment. Take, for example, the following playful exchange, lavishly 
decorated with smiling and winking faces in the original: ‘Well done, lass!!!’ (she the wolf, 
responding to a comment by Jolee) – ‘What lass, she has an internal impairment (of the 
hymen).’ (O!Sag) – ‘I love people with a sense of humour. You are right, my hymen is 
irreparably impaired.’ (Jolee) 
 
Another aspect of the male-centred culture is the association of masculinity with active 
agency and femininity with aesthetic appearance. Accordingly, the questions asked with 
regard to disabled people’s sexuality tend to follow two distinct, gender-specific formulas: 
(i) Can disabled men be sexually active despite their impairments? (ii) Can disabled women 
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be sexually attractive despite their impairments?10 On the one hand, disabled men’s 
sexuality is defended with respect to potency or the ability to perform sexually: ‘We are 
greater lovers than some of the healthy who are filled with complexes to the edges of their 
hair.’ (neponosim) If the presentation of a man is important, it is so only insofar as it 
manifests an ability to display sexual potency, physical strength and/or economic power: 
‘Well, as the saying goes, “The true man is recognized even when naked”, so why care 
about [bodily] deficiencies.’ (Sex Maniac) On the other hand, the sexuality of disabled 
women is defended (or denied) with respect to aesthetic appearance, as suggested in the 
comment cited above about the hypothetical woman with ‘huge purple spots on her skin’ 
(Kurator). Feminine appearance is seen as important in order to attract sexual attention 
and action. Reproducing and embodying this pattern, the Bulgarian transition has given 
birth and popularity to an odd couple: a stocky man dressed in trainers and track suit with 
a crew-cut haircut and an obligatory golden chain around his thick neck, accompanied by 
a slender woman with a fancy haircut, high heels, glossy clothing and expensive makeup. 
Disabled Bulgarians are excluded from this embodied ideal, where the masculine power to 
act complements and is complemented by the feminine ability to become an object of 
action. Indeed, similarly to the feminine body, the impaired body is also objectified; but 
while the feminine body is objectified as a sexual object (Young, 2005: 38-44), the 
impaired body is objectified as an a-sexual object (Hahn, 1990: 315), mostly within 
                                                 
10 Phillips (2010: 176) makes the following observation, reflecting on a mobility seminar for wheelchair users 
in Ukraine: ‘whereas most of the men at the meeting used active wheelchairs, the majority of women 
participants used large, so-called “room” or home wheelchairs, or lever-drive chairs operated by pumping 
two levers with the hands’. Thus the assignment of gendered lifestyles is mediated by assistive technology. 
What are these lifestyles? According to Phillips (2010: 186), ‘[g]oing out in public (being mobile) is seen as 
an important aspect of masculinity, but women seem more worried by their visible imperfections and are 
given more leeway to stay at home in their “traditional” setting’. 
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medicalised ‘regimes of truth’. This kind of asexual objectification is at the heart of the 
already discussed desexualisation of disabled people. 
 
Things get more complicated when familialist and reproductive expectations are added to 
the patriarchal mix. Familialism – the view that the nuclear family (comprising of a father, 
a mother and child/ren) is the defining element of good life – is still strong in Bulgaria. 
Summarising data from the European Values Study of 2008, Bulgarian sociologists point 
out that ‘[d]espite the crisis of the family institution, the family continues to be an absolute 
value [bezprekoslovna tsennost] for the Bulgarians’ (Pamporov, 2009: 167; see also 
Tomova, 2009: 143). In such a context, women are expected to be good mothers as well as 
attractive sexual objects. For some discussants these two roles collide: ‘It is just that I desire 
the woman who stays with me to be perfect, but if she is perfect, she will not be a good 
mother of her children… You know the saying, better an “unworthy” [nestruvashta] 
woman in your hands and in your home with the children than a beautiful, intelligent and 
bright one outside’ (HishtniK). Other discussants see women’s sexual appeal as a 
prerequisite for reproduction: ‘A woman, no matter how hollow her nut is [sic], has no 
problems with reproducing providing she has big tits, a tight body and nice butt.’ (High 
Carbon Steel) Notably, ‘[t]he same goes for a man, but in this case it is money which can 
secure him reproduction’ (High Carbon Steel). The appearance vs. agency dichotomy is 
clearly expressed here. Women are sexually valuable when aesthetically attractive and men 
when they are economically potent. In addition, sexuality is reduced to an instrument for 
procreation – a position which, again, excludes disabled people, for they as a rule tend to 
be ‘instinctively’ (Lilit) left out of the reproductive equation. 
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These gendered expectations are not fixed. Sometimes, it is disabled men’s sexuality that 
is salvaged through recourse to ‘beauty’: ‘Is a man like Andrea Bocelli not beautiful? Does 
the fact that he is blind make him ugly or rather different but still beautiful?’ (razbiram) 
There are also those discussants who, similarly to Zhisheva, question the sexual 
objectification of women (but note the structural similarity with Kurator’s comment about 
‘purple spots’ and blindness): ‘Do you make love to a woman only because of her body? 
Aren’t you attracted by her eyes, her radiance, her internal world, her sensibility, her 
principles, etc. Isn’t it possible to fall in love with all these things and thus to become blind 
to her impairment?’ (debi) Notwithstanding these occasional challenges, the gendered 
expectations of the male-centred worldview remain hegemonic throughout the discussion. 
Together with the taken-for-granted negativity of impairment and medicalisation, these 
rigid gendered expectations contribute to the desexualisation and the attendant existential-
ontological invalidation of disabled people. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, I explored the conjunction of disability and sexuality, drawing on examples 
from postsocialist Bulgaria. I focused on the social, political and cultural aspects of this 
intertwining, but I also looked at it in existential and ontological terms. The overall aim 
was to show how disablism is perpetuated and/or challenged within common, everyday 
understandings of the body, and, more specifically, of the bodily difference of impairment. 
These understandings were elicited by looking at non-expert public discourses on disability 
 35 
and sexuality. Two sources of information were used – an autobiographical essay and an 
internet discussion. Their analysis highlighted several general points.  
 
Firstly, the topic of disability and sexuality is silenced, mainly by subjecting it to an expert-
centred ‘regime of truth’. This silencing is directly related to a pervasive desexualisation 
of disabled people that is existentially-ontologically invalidating. Secondly, in the rare 
instances when they emerge, non-expert public discourses on disability and sexuality tend 
to be medicalised, thus reflecting the hegemony of medical knowledge, experts, 
institutions, technologies and practices in the domain of disability in Bulgaria. Thirdly, the 
bodily difference of impairment is as a rule understood in negative terms – as deficiency 
or lack. This understanding, supported by medicalisation, adds to the perception of disabled 
people as asexual beings, and accordingly, to their existential-ontological invalidation. 
Fourthly, impairment-related discourses are gendered along patriarchal lines. Thus 
gender-specific expectations informed by a male-centred worldview regulate the 
construction of disabled people’s identity, particularly when sexuality is concerned. All 
these patterns contribute to the (re)production of disablism in Bulgaria. 
 
At the same time, various instances of resistance to disablism were also highlighted in the 
context and content of Zhisheva’s essay and the dir.bg discussion. I underlined the crucial 
importance of opening up spaces for non-expert public reflection on disability and 
sexuality. The acts of disclosing and maintaining such ‘clearings’ themselves work to 
subvert disablist patterns. This subversion is greatly enhanced when those who are usually 
‘spoken about’ – i.e., disabled people themselves – reclaim their voices by speaking 
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publicly on their own sexuality. My analysis also suggested that the negative meanings 
attributed to particular bodily differences are inherently unstable. Consequently, disablism 
is undermined by exploiting and amplifying this instability of meaning, particularly within 
discourses on sexuality where corporeal understandings are pivotal. In addition, it is also 
important to openly and explicitly challenge the taken-for-granted negativity of 
impairment. Such direct attacks on disablism reach to its core, but this also means that they 
are prone to suffer the strongest repulse. In sum, each and every one of the aforementioned 
mechanisms of resistance needs to be deliberately cherished in attempts at overcoming 
disablism. 
 
I would like to finish this study with two methodological considerations. The first has to 
do with the relationship between analyses on ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels. Although the 
present study focused on the former, the critique of the everyday cannot displace structural 
critiques of the type outlined in the introduction, where I highlighted the broader factors 
underlying disablism in Bulgaria. In this sense, disability studies are very much like 
feminist and queer studies, conceived as: 
theoretical efforts to identify certain wrongful harms or injustices, locate and 
explain their sources in institutions and social relations, and propose directions for 
institutionally oriented action to change them. This latter set of tasks requires the 
theorist to have an account not only of individual experience, subjectivity, and 
identity, but also of social structures. (Young, 2005: 19-20) 
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My second methodological consideration has to do with my theoretical points of departure. 
I relied on two major concepts – the notion of ‘disablism’ borrowed from disability studies 
and the notion of the ‘lived body’ borrowed from phenomenology. While the former was 
explicitly used throughout the analysis, the latter was mostly implied in the ongoing refusal 
to take the negativity of impairment for granted. I see this refusal as crucial for challenging 
disablism. The notion of ‘lived body’ is useful for disability studies because it provides for 
such a refusal while retaining an embodied understanding of human being. It cannot be 
denied that physicality delimits human capacities (cf. Shakespeare and Watson, 2001), but 
neither can it be denied that these limits appear as limits and matter only within what 
phenomenologists call ‘clearing’ or ‘world’ – a ‘context within which relations of objects 
and activities are organized and make sense’ (Wrathal, 2006: 38). From this perspective, 
any ‘excess’ with respect to meaning is itself constituted within the meaning-giving 
context: ‘Sense itself opens the difference to what is not sense, without transforming it into 
another piece of sense’ (Steinmann, 2011: 48, cited in Polt, 2011: 49). Even if impairment 
is conceived in terms of such ‘excess’, it still cannot be reduced to a ‘limit without 
possibility’ (Titchkosky, 2005: 657). On the most general level, what exceeds meaning has 
the unique power to feed back and refresh it: ‘Encounters with excess can develop into 
crisis points, historical events in which meaning is refreshed or transformed; such events 
open new realms of meaning that, in turn, make it possible for us to encounter excess 
afresh.’ (Polt, 2011: 28) More specifically, bodily differences – including those identified 
as ‘impairments’ – bear the potential to refashion not only our customary identities and 
practices, but also the worlds we inhabit. In a disablist culture there is a pressing need to 
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realise this potential through strategies for recognition and affirmation. An important first 
step is breaking the silence surrounding the conjunction of disability and sexuality. 
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